论董事会的独立性对上市公司治理结构的完善——独立董事的产生及现状分析

现代公司制度的核心是要建立起完善的公司治理结构,董事会在公司治理结构中起着核心作用。但随着股份公司的股权进一步公众化,越来越多的研究报告揭示了董事会职能减弱的客观事实;同时,董事会日渐形成的内部控制与现代企业的发展形成矛盾。由此,西方在公司治理结构上引入了独立董事制,独立董事的功能已在现代企业法人治理结构中确立。     

Policy Issues Raised by For-Profit Spinoffs from Professional Associations: An Evaluation of a Recent AICPA Initiative

This paper provides an evaluation of the spinoff of a for-profit company from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a nonprofit professional association. The evaluation is based on a review of the literature on public policy issues surrounding organizational conversions from nonprofit to for-profit legal status. Many criticisms of this for-profit spinoff were voiced by professional leaders and accounting regulators, and we demonstrate that these criticisms are grounded in widely recognized policy principles relating to nonprofit conversions. The public policy issues raised by this study have implications for the governance of professional associations in all disciplines.     

国有银行应战外资银行的初级阶段及对策

国有银行面临着中国入世后外资银行的强大挑战。在中国银行业逐步开放的过程中，将会形成一个双方竞争的初级阶段。这个阶段是国有银行在同对方全面竞争前调整自己，适应新对手、新环境的难得机遇。本文分析了竞争初级阶段的特征及对手可能采取的策略，并阐述了发挥国有银行竞争优势、提高技术水平和管理能力的基本对策。     

组织和开展党派监督:新时期内地统战工作的核心

统一战线有广义和狭义之分,新时期内地统一战线的核心工作是组织和开展党派监督,这是统一战线理论假设运用于当代中国而形成的必然逻辑推论。要使这一核心工作得以落实,一些程序化的操作建议可供参考。     

论国有企业治理文化及其治理结构效应

企业治理文化是企业文化的有机组成部分,不同的治理文化会对企业治理结构产生不同的影响。本文在分析企业治理文化及其影响因素的基础上,着重探讨了国有企业治理文化及其治理结构效应,说明了加强国有企业治理结构建设,必须高度重视国有企业治理文化建设。     

市场失灵与企业创新

新古典理论认为市场失灵会使得资源配置的效率偏离帕累托最优状态,文章认为,市场失灵还会影响到企业的创新方向和创新数量,导致全社会该产生的创新可能创新不够,不该产生的创新却层出不穷,从而降低资源配置的长期效率,针对市场失灵的不同类型,政府只要采取不同的措施,就能够正确引导企业的创新行为。     

"非典"与流动人口管理模式改革路径的选择

从人口迁移规律入手,分析了"非典"流行期间,北京流动人口管理中存在的种种问题,认为这是执行流动人口和户籍人口"分立并行"管理体制的结果;提出了以"居住地人口管理"模式取代"户籍属地管理"模式的改革设想.     

企业契约形式、财权安排与财务治理演进

本文认为,企业契约形式与财权安排及财务治理具有非常密切的内在联系。对我国不同时期企业契约形式的考察,发现财权安排具有内在逻辑,企业财务治理在不同历史时期具有不同的演进特征。     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.